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Abstract1
 
 
This paper analyzes mortgage loan demand in Argentina  using a new survey 
administered in the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area.  It is found that recuring 
macro volatility and violation of financial property rights have increased demand 
for real estate as an investment, which in turn raises house prices and makes it 
more dificult for consumer households to meet minimum income requirements 
for obtaining a mortgage. Afordability thus seems to ofer a beter explanation 
than standard supply side constraints for the smal size of the mortgage market in 
Argentina. Overal, the findings suggest that the shalow mortgage market has not 
posed a major impediment to home ownership rate in Argentina and that the smal 
(and shrinking) mortgage market has more to do with lack of demand than credit 
supply constraints. 
 
JEL classifications: G21, R21, R31 
Keywords: Housing, Mortgage market, Macro volatility, Argentina 
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1. Introduction 
 
The mortgage market in Argentina quickly expanded during the  1990s as a result of the 
economic boom, market-oriented reforms in the financial sector, and an upgrading to 
international best practices in the mortgage regulatory framework. The stock of mortgage loans 
increased from 0.9 to 6 percent  of GDP between 1990 and 2000. Mortgage loans became an 
important product for banks (36 percent of their loan portfolio) and for new homeowners (30 
percent of new titles were mortgage-financed). Whereas the stock of total credit to the private 
sector increased by two-and-a-half times over the 1990s, the stock of mortgage loans increased 
fivefold.2
Macroeconomic conditions changed dramaticaly by the end of 2001, however,  when 
Argentina was hit by a massive financial crisis (after three years of stagnation). In December of 
2001 a sovereign default was announced, and in January 2002 the curency board was 
abandoned. The local currency drasticaly devaluated from one peso per US dolar to almost four 
per dolar in a few months. The devaluation produced widespread balance sheet efects in a 
highly  dolarized economy, and several emergency measures were taken. Deposits in foreign 
curency were “pesified” at 1.4 pesos per dolar (wel below the market rate, implying large 
losses for depositors) and banking loans in foreign curency were pesified at one peso per dolar 
(implying large gains for debt holders).
 
3
The exit of the crisis was V-shaped, favored by the international context and the boom in 
commodity prices. Between 2009 and 2002 the economy grew at an impressive annual rate of 
7.5 percent, whereas construction grew 16 percent annualy.  Housing prices in US dolars 
bounced back and even surpassed the 1990s levels, at the time that real incomes and employment 
 In this period, mortgage loans were pesified as wel, and 
foreclosures  were temporarily suspended. Real GDP and private consumption plummeted 10.9 
percent and 14.4 percent, respectively, in 2002 alone, down 18.4 percent and 21.4 percent, 
respectively, from their pre-crisis peak in 1998. Argentina’s crisis was reflected in the value of 
local assets in US dolars. The Merval index (which reflects the value of major companies listed 
on the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange) fel drasticaly, and real estate prices in US dolars 
plunged by 50 percent on average in Buenos Aires City. 
                         
2 The paper mainly deals with mortgage housing finance through the banking system. However, at some points in 
the document, reference wil be made to other forms of public or private housing finance. 
3 For a description of the Argentine crisis see Auguste et al. (2006). Agarwal, Chomsisengphet and Hassler (2005) 
describe the housing finance policies implemented during the crisis. 
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recovered as wel. But, in spite of the general economic improvement after the crisis, the 
mortgage market never went back to its pre-crisis depth.  In 2009 the stock of mortgage loans 
represented just 1.6 percent of GDP, or 15 percent of total private sector credit, compared to 6.2 
percent and 35 percent, respectively, in 2001. In that year, only 6  percent of new titles were 
financed by mortgage loans, compared to 25.5 percent in 2001. Evidently, the housing market 
recovered with less leverage. 
The focus of our paper is on the demand side of the mortgage market. We believe supply 
side restrictions (the reluctance by banks to lend long-term) cannot fuly explain the post-crisis 
contraction in mortgage loans, since overal credit conditions have been beter in the 2000s than 
in the 1990s. Banks have been very liquid, in a context of very low real interest rates (actualy 
almost zero, compared to 15 percent in the previous decade). Also inconsistent with supply side 
restrictions is the fact that in the 2000s banks ofered mortgages at longer durations and higher 
loan-to-value ratios than in the 1990s. In addition, government interventions pushing the supply 
(through interventions in the secondary market and increasing direct lending through public 
banks) have not had noticeable efects on the equilibrium number of mortgage loans either. The 
lack of a dynamic mortgage market is hard to reconcile with a booming housing market in terms 
of prices, transactions and newly built units unless mortgage demand restrictions are at work. 
The Argentine case is of particular interest in determining the role of demand in mortgage 
market underdevelopment and the role of real estate as a safe asset, beyond the usual housing 
services. As a result of the expropriation afecting most financial assets, investors have gradualy 
increased the housing share in their portfolios in the aftermath of the crisis, thus  pushing  up 
housing activity (transactions, prices, and construction). But higher prices vis-à-vis household 
income generates affordability problems for families trying to buy their home, thus reducing the 
demand for mortgages. Equaly important, understanding the role of housing as a vehicle for 
long-term saving is key to solving the seeming paradox of high home-ownership rates coexisting 
with a tiny mortgage market. 
The Argentine case remains largely underexplored. Kiguel and Podjarny (2007) provide 
descriptive statistics of the recent evolution of the mortgage market for Argentina, Chile and 
Uruguay to investigate the factors explaining the relative success of Chile. They claim that, 
although there are differences in the legal framework and financial instruments used in primary 
and secondary markets, they do not seem to  be the main explanation for the  unequal levels of 
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development among the three countries. On the contrary, the most important variables in 
explaining the diferences are macroeconomic conditions. These include the folowing: 
 
1. A stable curency to finance long-term fixed-rate loans or, in the presence 
of double-digit inflation, indexation, loans in hard curencies, or other 
adjustment mechanisms that alow for long-term contracts. 
2. For the first condition to work wel in practice, the economy  must 
maintain a certain level of macroeconomic stability, especialy regarding 
the exchange rate, price levels and interest rates. 
3. The existence of mechanisms for flexible and standardized mortgage 
origination (primary market) and institutional investors to provide a long-
term horizon financing to feed the secondary market. 
4. Potential mortgage  holders, especialy employees, must be able to meet 
the credit requirements to qualify for a loan, a situation sometimes 
dificult to achieve in an environment where the ratio of housing prices to 
wages is high and nominal interest rates are high as wel. 
 
Their conclusions are based on descriptive macro statistics and a simulation exercise on the 
behavior of payment-to-income ratio that a hypothetical mortgage holder should have to pay 
under a standard fixed rate loan in each country according to its macro volatility history.4
Cristini and Moya (2004) analyze the deepening of the mortgage market in the 1990s 
compared to the failure of the  1980s, concluding that the rapid takeof is due to both 
macroeconomic stability and the development of legal and market institutions. Banzas and 
Fernández (2007) describe the Argentine case including the 2001/2002 crisis. Using household 
survey (EPH) data for 2007, they perform a simple afordability exercise and find that, in spite of 
the more favorable conditions ofered by banks, almost 60 percent of the population does not 
satisfy the minimum requirements for obtaining a mortgage loan.
 
5
                         
4 In a 10-year loan indexed to CPI with an initial loan payment-to-income ratio of 30 percent, the probability that the 
ratio goes above 40 percent for 12 consecutive months is 53 percent in Argentina and just 3 percent in Chile, which 
means that in a standard mortgage contract, an Argentine household faces greater risk of experiencing difficulties in 
repayment. 
 
5 In the exercise they use prices for the cheapest neighborhoods of Buenos Aires City, and they generously correct 
family income upwards to compensate for underreporting. Their results should thus be interpreted as a lower bound, 
i.e., the percentage of excluded families may exceed 60 percent. 
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Cristini and Moya (2008) analyze housing across Latin America and find, inter alia, that 
the region has high ownership at the expense of quality. Cristini and Iaryczower (1997), 
evaluating the public housing finance system FONAVI based on a simulation exercise using 
household survey (EPH) microdata, find that the implicit subsidy (from 20 to 80 percent, 
depending on the province) is too high and unequaly distributed. Although the decentralization 
of the 1990s helped to improve eficiency, there are stil middle-income households receiving the 
subsidy. Gaba et al. (2003) explore the possibility of introducing an indexation system similar to 
Chile’s, and Delgobbo (2000) evaluates the competitive efects of the creation of a secondary 
institution by one of the most important mortgage banks in Argentina.6
These papers are based either on macro data or household survey data, as micro data on 
housing finance are nearly nonexistent. An exception is Agarwal, Chomsisengphet and Hassler 
(2005), who also study the 2001/2002 crisis in Argentina. These authors use a unique loan-level 
data set to empiricaly assess the impact of the curency devaluation and the economic response 
policies on prepayment and default paterns of residential mortgages as a consequence of the 
previously mentioned pesification of bank loans and deposits. 
 
For the present research work, we exploit for the first time a preexisting living conditions 
survey including some limited data on housing finance and, especialy, a  unique survey 
conducted for this study. This information is particularly suitable for exploring the state of the 
housing finance system (with primary but not exclusive emphasis on the mortgage market) and 
the demand drivers behind it.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as folows. Section 2 briefly describes the 
housing and housing finance system in Argentina. Section 3 provides a discussion on the recent 
evolution of the Argentine mortgage market. Section 4 describes the novel micro-data used and 
reports the main findings, and Section 5 ofers concluding remarks. 
 
                         
6 Warnock and Warnock (2008) provide cross-country evidence of the variables affecting mortgage depth, where 
Argentina is included, finding that countries with stronger legal rights (through colateral and bankruptcy laws), 
deeper credit information systems, and a more stable macroeconomic environment have deeper housing finance 
systems. Across developed countries, which tend to have low macroeconomic volatility and relatively extensive 
credit information systems, variation in the strength of legal rights helps explain the extent of housing finance.  
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2. Housing and Housing Finance in Argentina 
 
2.1 Housing 
 
As mentioned earlier, the ownership rate is rather high in Argentina, with a level of around 70 
percent. In fact, housing quality problems are more pervasive than ownership. According to the 
last Census available, the quantitative deficit of housing by 2001 was equivalent to 8.6 percent of 
households, but the qualitative deficit (measured by households living in recoverable—i.e., low-
quality—dwelings or in overcrowded rooms) was 20.2 percent. More recent data can be 
obtained from the National Household Survey, which is conducted in Argentina’s major urban 
areas (2010 Census results were not available at the time of writing). As shown in Tables 1 
through 4, while home ownership has decreased in the late 2000s (especialy for middle to high-
income households and young household heads), an increase has taken place in house size 
(measured by number of rooms) except for the richest quintile, along with a reduction in the 
number of persons per room and an overal improvement in the quality of dwelings. The same 
trend of home ownership is observed in Uruguay but not in Brazil and Chile.7
 
 
 
Table 1. Argentina: Tenure and Type of Dwelings 
 
 1991 2001 
 Owners 61.5% 70.6% 
 Renters 12.3% 11.1% 
 Others 26.2% 18.2% 
Type of dwelings 
Houses 79.4% 82.4% 
     Good quality 65.4% 69.0% 
     Reasonable quality 14.0% 13.4% 
Shanties 3.3% 3.2% 
Apartments 16.1% 14.3% 
Others 1.2% 0.1% 
   Source: Authors’ estimates based on Censuses of Population.  
                         
7 Methodological changes in household surveys limit the time series analysis of housing. In the case of Argentina, 
the EPH was replaced in 2003 by the Continuous EPH. 
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Table 2. Argentina: Quantitative and Qualitative Deficits, 1980-2001 
 
Indicator 1980 1991 2001 
(1) Households (000’s) 7,572.3 8,927.3 10,075.8 
(2) Occupied units (000’s) 6,798.3 7,743.5 9,204.7 
    Good quality dwelings 6,198.7 6,281.9 7,628.2 
    Recoverable dwelings 
    (low quality)  
599.6 1,461.6 1,576.5 
Quantitative Deficit 
Quantity of houses (000’s (2)-(1)) 774.1 1,183.8 871.1 
   As % of households 10.2 13.3 8.6 
Qualitative Deficit 1/ 
Quantity of houses (000’s) 2,288.3 2,497.9 2,036.3 
   As % of households 30.2 28.0 20.2 
 Source: Authors’ estimates based on Censuses of Population.  
 1/ Recoverable dwelings plus units with overcrowded rooms.  
 
 
Table 3. Argentine Main Urban Areas: Tenure and Type of Dwelings 
 
   Income Quintile 
Total 
Age Range 
  1 2 3 4 5 
16-
24 
25-
40 
41-
64 65+ Total 
Home-
ownership 
1999 57.9 65.5 69.8 72.3 79.2 70.2 28.1 55.4 78.5 84.7 71.3 
2009 56.2 63.1 68.3 70.2 69.0 66.2 23.2 44.4 74.3 84.5 66.2 
Number of 
rooms per house 
1999 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.9 3.3 2.9 2.2 2.6 3.2 2.9 2.9 
2009 2.6 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.0 2.0 2.6 3.2 3.1 3.0 
Persons per 
room 
1999 2.2 1.7 1.3 1.1 0.9 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.4 0.8 1.4 
2009 2.0 1.5 1.3 1.1 0.8 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.3 0.8 1.3 
Share of “poor” 
dwelings 
1999 7.5 3.9 2.8 2.1 0.6 3.0 6.7 4.5 2.1 1.4 2.8 
2009 6.4 3.1 1.7 1.4 0.5 2.3 7.1 3.5 1.8 1.0 2.3 
Share of 
dwelings of 
low-quality 
materials 
1999 4.3 2.4 1.6 1.0 0.4 1.7 1.5 1.9 1.4 1.7 1.6 
2009 4.6 1.9 0.9 0.6 0.4 1.4 3.5 1.7 1.3 1.1 1.4 
Note: 1999 figures are based on the Permanent Household Survey (EPH) and 2009 on Continuous 
Permanent Household Survey (EPHC) (in 2003 EPH was replaced by EPHC, but the same urban areas 
are included in the sample) 
Source: CEDLAS/SEDLAC. 
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Table 4. Urban Areas: Home Ownership Rate by Income Quintile  
 
   Income Quintile 
Total   1 2 3 4 5 
Argentina 1999 57.9 65.5 69.8 72.3 79.2 70.2 2009 56.2 63.1 68.3 70.2 69.0 66.2 
Brazil 1999 63.6 66.4 69.6 71.4 74.9 70.1 2008 65.7 66.5 69.9 72.9 76.2 71.0 
Chile 1998 54.8 62.7 69.5 70.4 70.5 66.6 2006 57.0 66.1 69.6 70.9 69.1 67.0 
Uruguay 1998 43.9 60.1 69.6 76.6 82.6 69.3 2006 30.7 50.7 62.3 68.7 75.9 60.7 
                  Source: CEDLAS/SEDLAC. 
 
2.2 Housing Finance 
 
In Argentina there are two main sources of housing finance: bank mortgages and public housing 
programs. Other types of financing or mortgages from non-banking institutions are not common. 
A massive state housing program has been in place for several decades in Argentina, 
based on a supply-side, turnkey production system targeting the poor. It is not based on a 
mortgage-type contract, although households have to pay a (generaly fixed) monthly payment 
for a period of time after the house is alocated. The payment implies a generous subsidy that 
deters any fair private sector competition. 
FONAVI (Fondo Nacional de la Vivienda, National Housing Fund) and Programas 
Federales are the most important housing programs. Together they supply almost one quarter of 
the flow of new units in the country each year. 
FONAVI has historicaly  displayed severe flaws, among them the folowing: i) it 
overwhelmingly produces new units for sale to moderate and middle-income households, rather 
than a wider range of low-cost housing solutions suited to low-income families; i) membership 
neither requires households to make a down payment nor obtain a private market-rate loan, so 
that households are fuly financed by the program under heavily subsidized conditions; and ii) 
the institutional design for decentralization generates low incentives to the eficient use of funds. 
(See for instance, Gautier et al., 2006, and Moya, Bermúdez and Sparacino, 2010). 
From a long-term perspective, public programs have built more than 1 milion houses 
since 1976, which represents around 30 percent of new housing stock in the same period. Since 
9 
 
2003 the rate of public housing construction has increased and new programs have proliferated.  
In line with these developments, federal expenditure on housing has almost doubled, increasing 
from 0.45 percent of GDP in 1990s to 0.7 percent in the 2000s. Many of these recent federal 
initiatives continue to display some of the crucial weaknesses of the old system. In particular, 
they have failed, as in other Latin American programs, to replace turnkey production with direct 
demand-subsidy programs that use private developers and lenders to build new units for 
moderate-income households much more efectively. 
Figure 1 displays the flow of government housing resources and that of housing 
mortgages supplied by the banking system, both in percentage of GDP, which indicates the 
growing role of public housing programs relative to commercial mortgage financing. 
 
Figure 1. Flow of Housing State Programs and Bank Housing Mortgages, 1994-2008 
(% of GDP) 
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 While government housing programs have not promoted the development of the 
mortgage market, they do not seem to have hurt it significantly, since massive public  housing 
programs are intended for a population segment of litle interest to the mortgage market.8
 
 As for 
direct interventions in the later market, they have been very smal in scale, and thus they did not 
have any perceptible efect on market size or structure.  
2.3 Mortgage Market 
 
Al indicators confirm that this market, despite an incipient but stil trifling takeof in the 1990s, 
remains largely undeveloped even after the post-crisis economic recovery. 
Historicaly the mortgage market was very smal in Argentina. In the 1970s and 1980s it 
was dominated by public banks. A moderate and short-lived boom in mortgage loans took place 
in the mid-1990s in response to proper macroeconomic and institutional conditions. Total 
mortgage loans jumped from 1.8 percent of GDP in 1993 to a maximum of 6.2 percent of GDP 
in 2001. Mortgage loans for housing increased from 2 percent to 4 percent of GDP in the same 
period. 
As a consequence of the 2001-2002 crisis, private credit dropped from 20.1 percent  of 
GDP in 2001 to 11.4 percent in 2009, whereas mortgage loans fel from 6.2  percent to 1.6 
percent of GDP (from 4 percent to 1 percent in the case of housing loans). Likewise, the stock of 
mortgage loans represented 31 percent of the total stock of credit to the private sector in 2001 
and only 14.5 percent in 2009 (see Figure 1). This clearly indicates that mortgages were hit even 
harder than private credit as a whole. 
 
                         
8 Nevertheless, recent estimates from a survey on this topic indicate that some filtering might be happening. In fact, 
although 41 percent of beneficiaries belong to households in the lowest two income deciles, 11 percent display 
incomes comparable to the highest 20 percent of the distribution. This filtering seems to be more important among 
FONAVI´s beneficiaries than the more recent programs (the so caled Programas Federales). See Moya, Bermúdez 
and Sparacino (2010). 
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Figure 2. Private Credit and Mortgage Credit in Argentina, 1969-2009 
 
  
 
The structure of loans, presented in Table 2 of the Statistical Appendix, reveals that bank 
credit in Argentina is mostly biased toward short-term lines such as overdrafts, bils, personal, 
and credit card loans, which account for 66.4 percent of total loans before the crisis (1994-2000) 
and 73.1 percent after the crisis (2003-2009). Mortgage loans represented 24.9 percent before the 
crisis, peaked at 36.4 percent (presumably because of their longer maturity at a time when other 
loans were not being made) and dropped to 21 percent of the total in the period 2003-2009. 
Considered on a year-by-year basis, though, this share has dropped from 35.5 percent in 2003 to 
a mere 15.4 percent in 2009. According to Table 3, both before and after the crisis, only about 30 
percent of mortgage loans have maturities above 10 years, while the rest are under 5 years (50 
percent) and between 5 and 10 years (20 percent). The nominal interest rate on mortgage loans 
(see Table 4) has averaged around 14 percent throughout the period. While high by  international 
standards, it must be recaled that it was especialy so in the 1990s when a fixed exchange rate 
and low inflation were the norm. In contrast, the inflationary regime prevalent since 2005 has 
rendered nominal interest rates in the 15 to 20 percent range slightly positive or just negative in 
real terms.9
The smal size and lack of aggregate impact of the housing mortgage market can be 
visualized through other indicators as wel. Using publicly unavailable information from Central 
 
                         
9 For instance, as of July 2010, the nominal interest rate is about 18 percent which, after adding 4 percentage points 
for administrative costs, amounts to 22 percent, against a projected annual inflation rate of 25 to 30 percent.  
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de Deudores (the credit register administered by the Central Bank) over 2002-2009, Table 5 in 
the Statistical Appendix indicates the folowing: 
 
• Housing mortgage loans have steadily increased over time as a share of total 
mortgages but stil account for only between 28 and 50 percent of total 
mortgages (both in terms of volumes and number of borowers), the rest being 
mortgages granted to enterprises;  
• The banking system has only 158,000 housing mortgage clients in 2009 
(down from 182,000 in 2002). For a country where more than three milion 
households do not own a house, this figure looks quite insignificant. 
• The average loan size is remarkably low compared to home values. While 
loans have moved from US$6,000 in 2002 to US$14,000 in 2007-2009, the 
average value of urban houses, with obvious diferences by location, has been 
between US$30,000 and US$60,000. This would mean that actual loan-to-
value ratios are quite low and/or some loans are used for home remodeling 
and improvements (or to cover other expenses not related to housing) rather 
than to buy a new home. 
 
As an additional proof of the low penetration of housing mortgages, Table 6 displays the 
number of new property titles in Buenos Aires City, the country’s richest district in per capita 
GDP terms. The percentage of mortgage-related titles reached its peak in 1994 (34.7 percent). In 
general, the figure for 1991-2000 (29.5 percent), while already low, is more than four times 
higher than the 2003-2009 level of 6.7 percent. 
The configuration of the mortgage market by bank in 2002 and 2009 appears in Tables 
7A and 7B. In both cases, substantial concentration in only a few institutions is observed. The 
top five banks account for 76.2 percent of total volume in 2002 and 86.6 percent in 2009, while 
for the top 10 the cumulative share exceeds 95 percent. No change is found when looking at the 
number of borowers instead of loan volume. The two largest public banks (Banco Nación and 
Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires), the private and foreign-owned Santander Río and 
BBVA Francés, and Banco Hipotecario (with both private and public sector ownership) have 
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appeared in the top five on both dates. The last column of both tables shows that the average loan 
size has shrunk from US$27,350 to US$12,400 between 2002 and 2009.10
 
 
3. Key Stylized Facts about Mortgage Financing in Argentina 
 
In order to make sense of the curent state of housing finance in Argentina, with an emphasis on 
mortgage finance, a number of stylized facts from the 1990s and the 2000s must be highlighted. 
Furthermore, these observations provide evidence to support or reject the demand-driven 
hypothesis advanced in this paper. 
 
3.1 Mortgage Regulation and Other Government Interventions 
 
Since the mid-1990s, mortgage regulation in Argentina has been friendly or at least innocuous, 
leaving the private sector broad flexibility in designing its products. In the 1990s overal and 
mortgage-specific banking regulations were upgraded in Argentina to adapt to the best 
international practices, a credit bureau (Central de Deudores) was created, the legal framework 
was amended to facilitate the issuance of mortgage-backed assets and some public banks were 
privatized. These changes, within a stable macroeconomic environment and the dolar as a unit 
of value for long-term saving and lending (legaly set as a curency board), were instrumental to 
a modest mortgage market boom. As regulations did not substantialy change between the 1990s 
and 2000s—if anything, they were in some aspects improved in some aspects—no regulatory 
overkil can explain the colapse of the mortgage market in the last decade.11,12
                         
10 It can be seen that, as of 2009, Banco Nación and Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires offer larger loans 
(US$18,800 and US$15,700, respectively) than other institutions. In terms of policy implications, this may involve 
selection of high-income clients (contrary to the educated prior regarding the role of public banks in targeting lower 
income groups) and/or to higher loan-to-value ratios. 
 For the sake of 
exposition, the regulatory framework wil be divided into several areas, which immediately 
folow. 
11 At any rate, the prohibition of inflation-indexed contracts appears as the only major regulatory constraint on the 
mortgage market. Given the fact that the lack of indexation entails a macro-level policy rather than a mortgage-
specific one, it remains to be seen whether an indexation regime would remove the current reluctance of banks and 
potential clients to enter the mortgage market on a massive scale, which would require al key relative prices to be 
credibly anchored in the long-run. 
12 At present, banks offer fixed, variable and mixed interest rates and have launched some innovative products in 
terms of long-term adjustment (for example, Banco Nación has a line where the interest rate adjusts to wage 
increases, and payments have a cap in terms of client income). However, this varied menu has not increased the 
demand for mortgages, nor has the zero to negative real interest rate. This is consistent with the fact that the interest 
rate, especialy the short-term one, is the only risk factor in a mortgage contract. Real income and unemployment 
risk may likely play a larger effect on the decision to apply for such a loan. 
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3.1.1 Securitization and Other Capital Market-Related Reforms 
 
Law 24.441 (Law of Housing Finance and Construction), passed in 1994, established new 
instruments to facilitate housing finance through capital markets. Folowing international best 
practices, the norm set up the legal framework for the securitization of mortgage bank loans via 
the issuance of financial trusts (fideicomisos financieros). Likewise, it authorized the issuance of 
Letras Hipotecarias (mortgage-backed securities). These reforms were folowed in 2000 with the 
creation of Banco de Crédito y Securitización (BACS), a second-tier institution to promote these 
transactions, owned by Banco Hipotecario (70 percent), International Financial Corporation (20 
percent), IRSA (an Argentine listed company, with a 5.1 percent share), and Quantum Industrial 
Partners (a foreign investment fund, owning the remaining 4.9 percent). Once the economy 
stabilized after the 2001-2002 crisis, BACS initiated its operations with the issuance of Cédulas 
Hipotecarias (mortgage-backed securities). These favorable changes for the securitization 
process were accompanied by beter macroeconomic conditions than in the past and by the 
inception of the private pension system in 1994, which was thought to fuel a large demand for 
such long-term securities. To further foster securitization, in July 1997 the Central Bank issued, 
through Comunicación “A” 2563, an Origination Manual for Mortgage Loans aimed at 
standardizing loans so as to increase the critical mass of those eligible for securitization. 
The outcome, however, has not lived up to expectations. Financial trusts have never taken 
of, with a stock of 0.5 percent of GDP and just 4.5 percent of total bank loans securitized on 
average for 2000-2009 (see Table 8A). These values are even lower in recent years: in 2009, for 
example, they were 0.3 percent and 2.8 percent, respectively. Mortgages account for an equaly 
decreasing share of these trusts, from a maximum of 78.4 percent in 2002 to 19.2 percent in 
2009. Housing mortgages, in turn, represent about 50 percent of total mortgage-based financial 
trusts. Table 8B shows the smal volume of securitized total mortgages (10.7 percent in 2000-
2009) and housing mortgages (17.6 percent). Cédulas Hipotecarias represented 11 percent  of 
total mortgage-based trusts over 2000-2008, but jumped to 77.8 percent in 2009 thanks to the use 
of retirement funds now administered by the government and previously managed by the private 
pension funds, which were nationalized in 2008.13
                         
13 Another failed initiative from the Central Bank has been the promotion of a swaps market, which would alow 
banks to transfer to other investors their long-term, fixed interest rate loans—such as most mortgages, at least in 
their first years—to match their floating interest rate obligations. In spite of the Central Bank auctions, the interbank 
swaps market has not traded more than US$1.2 bilion per year since 2006. Delfiner (2010) lists a number of reasons 
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3.1.2 Foreclosure Procedures 
 
Law 24.441 additionaly created a special out-of-court foreclosure setlement which, unlike the 
regular judicial course of action, includes a precise and short (60 days) timeline from the moment 
the mortgage becomes non-performing to the point at which the property is transferred to the 
creditor on an expedited basis. In practice, according to market sources, this reform was of 
limited help in accelerating repossession procedures, which stil last approximately two to four 
years. 
However, a noticeable step backward for creditor rights was the suspension of 
foreclosure proceedings in the aftermath of the 2002 crisis. By Law 25.563, passed in February 
2002, the Congress suspended al mortgage foreclosures for 180 days. This legal step was 
intended to cope with the financial distress of those borowers with dolar-denominated liabilities 
and peso-denominated incomes, whose ability to repay was seriously impaired by the steep peso 
devaluation after the abandonment of the Convertibility Plan. After several extensions of this 
norm, Law 26.167 of 2006 prohibited any foreclosure on houses for unpaid loans under 
AR$100,000 at origination, applying it to mortgages finalized between January 1, 2001 and 
September 11, 2003. In 2003 a new mechanism (Sistema de Refinanciación Hipotecaria, Law 
25.798, passed in November 2003) was put in place to aleviate the situation of delinquent 
mortgage borowers with debts under AR$100,000 at origination, whereby past-due loans were 
transferred to a trust administered by Banco Nación. In this case the beneficiaries were not only 
bank borowers but also those indebted with non-bank, informal intermediaries (which are 
estimated to constitute 40 percent of al failed mortgage borowers). The trust was commissioned 
to recover unpaid loans under benign conditions for borowers, while canceling past-due services 
with government bonds.14
At the same time, loans were pesified at the pre-crisis exchange rate of 1 peso per US 
dolar, while bank liabilities were alowed to keep track of the official exchange rate, initialy set 
at $1.4 peso per dolar. Later in 2002 debts were adjusted by a wage-linked index (Coeficiente de 
Variación Salarial). Law 26.167 of 2006 finaly determined that the amount of debt should be 
the lowest between the above indexed value and the original outstanding debt converted at the $1 
 
                                                                               
for this disappointing situation, including: i) institutional and economic instability; i) lack of interested investors, as 
most banks are on the same side of the market, and of specialized market makers, with the sole exception of the 
Central Bank; and ii) the short-term bias of banks’ assets and liabilities, which undermine the demand for long-term 
derivatives such as swaps and hinders the development of a term structure of interest rates. 
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per US dolar exchange rate plus 30 percent of the wedge between the market exchange rate and 
the $1 peso per dolar parity, plus 2.5 percent annual interest. 
In terms of policy implications, these actions provided relief for many households, but it 
represented a violation of creditor rights, which has undermined the wilingness of depositors to 
invest in the banking system and the wilingness of banks to make mortgage loans.15
 
 
3.1.3 Mortgage Afordability-Related Regulatory Measures 
 
In August 2006, the Central Bank issued Comunicación “A” 4551 alowing banks to lend up to 
100 percent of the value of the property whenever this value does not exceed AR$200,000, and 
up to 90 percent when the value ranges from AR$200,001 to AR$300,000. Previously, the 
regulatory upper limit for al mortgages was 70 percent. This norm was designed to ease access 
to credit by households unable to save enough for the down payment. As we found in interviews 
with bankers,  however, this reform was inconsequential, as the maximum loan-to-value ratio 
found in the market has remained around 70 percent. This stems from the fact that the actual 
binding constraint is insuficient afordability to Argentine households, as shown earlier in the 
document. 
 
3.1.4 Mortgage Afordability-Related Direct State Interventions 
 
In recent years, the government has sought to promote the development of the mortgage market 
through more direct interventions seeking to confront the afordability problem. Two initiatives 
are worth mentioning. In August 2006, the “Plan Inquilinos” (“Renters Plan”). The goal was to 
confront the affordability constraint by enabling renters to buy a house with similar 
characteristics to the one they were living in while paying a monthly amount no higher than their 
monthly rent. However, the only pecuniary support from the government was the reimbursement 
of the 21 percent value added tax on the materials bought to build a new house. The plan failed 
as a result of the wedge between monthly payment and rent, which is at the heart of the 
afordability issue.16
 
  
                         
15 Nevertheless, it must be noted that banks, even before the crisis, were reluctant to go forward with foreclosure 
procedures, and were and stil are more inclined to exhaust out-of-court debt renegotiation. 
16 According to Reporte Inmobiliario, a business magazine specialized in real estate, only 3,049 mortgages were 
granted under this scheme. The same publication asserts “It could have had some impact if people were flexible 
enough to move to less expensive locations. But this is not the usual choice, and thus many prefer remaining as 
tenants.” 
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In May 2009 the government launched a housing finance plan backed by retirement funds 
maintained by Administración Nacional de la Seguridad Social (ANSES), with Banco 
Hipotecario acting as the direct, first-tier lender. Despite this alegedly softer funding source, the 
fixed interest rate was set at 10 percent for new construction, 13.95 percent for purchase of new 
homes and 15.95 percent for existing houses. When administrative expenses were included these 
figures went up to 14 percent, 18 percent and 20 percent, respectively. The program did not have 
any noticeable impact on the mortgage market as a whole. 
 
3.1.5 Pro-Informal Borrowers’ Regulatory Measures 
 
Comunicación “A” 4551 of 2006 also alowed banks to use credit scoring to accept or reject 
mortgage loan applications under AR$200,000 instead of requiring formal income 
documentation. This was thought to ease the access to credit to informal workers. In practice, 
this caused no major change in the pool of borrowers. Banks, according to interviews, were 
already lending to partialy informal workers. In such cases, the bank would set a higher 
payment-to-income ratio (for example, up to 50 percent of formal income) to account for the 
undocumented income (estimated via documented wealth or bank movements). However, fuly 
informal workers did not gain access to this market after the measure was put in place. 
 
3.2. Portfolio Choices, Afordability and Ownership 
 
In the 2001/2002 crisis deposits were frozen and partialy confiscated, but this was not the only 
episode of deposit confiscation in Argentina; in 1990 large deposits were compulsorily 
exchanged for government bonds. Since Argentine economic history displays recuring banking 
and currency crises, it is not surprising that a distinctive feature of the Argentine financial 
environment is savers’ have grown to deeply distrust formal financial intermediaries.  
An eloquent testimony to this phenomenon is the evolution of domestic credit to the 
private sector, as shown in Figure 3. In 1960, it represented 14 percent of GDP in Argentina and 
17 percent, on average, in the rest of South America. At present, however, those values are about 
12 percent and 40 percent, respectively. Even during the flourishing 1990s, private credit to GDP 
did not exceed 25 percent. 
The lack of reliance on banks means that savings are held in other assets. Lack of 
confidence, coupled with the lack of capital market alternatives open to the average investor 
(stocks, bonds, and derivatives), and the fact that not everybody has the financial sophistication 
18 
 
and volume of resources to open ofshore accounts, has apparently led households to use real 
estate as a vehicle for financial investment. Although not fuly liquid, the public considers it a 
safe asset in terms of property rights (unlike financial assets, real estate has not sufered 
expropriations of any sort) and protection against inflation and devaluations. 
 
Figure 3. Financial Disintermediation: Argentina and South America 
 
Domestic Credit to Private Sector as % GDP, 1960-2008 Financial Depth (M2/GDP), 1961-2008 
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In an economy where real estate appears to have become the local safe asset, one should 
draw the folowing empirical predictions:17
 
 
1. The presence of real estate investors (as opposed to real estate consumers) 
should put upward pressure on house prices and thus reduce affordability, 
under the sensible assumption that investors have a much higher income than 
consumers and that the former self-finance their housing investments while 
the later are more likely to need a mortgage or other kind of loan; 
2. As a result of (1), the house ownership rate should drop, as the number of 
households faling into the category of real estate consumers is much larger 
than that of real estate investors;  
3. Lower afordability takes a tol on the mortgage demand;18
                         
17 The safer an asset (housing) becomes relative to other assets (deposits), the lower should be its relative return. 
Since mortgages loans are financed with deposits, its interest rate wil always exceed the deposit interest rate, which 
makes it unatractive from the investor’s perspective to go into debt (mortgage) to buy a home. 
 
18 One may wonder why consumer households, instead of taking the binary decision of obtaining a mortgage loan of 
the desired size (to buy their target house/neighborhood) or no mortgage at al, do not adjust their leverage to buy an 
afordable unit. The answer is that such downgrade and loss of socioeconomic status would entail a large 
psychological burden, to the point that these people may decide to postpone the decision to own a house (see, for 
19 
 
4. Higher house prices, if also higher in terms of construction costs, should also 
encourage new construction; and 
5. Larger supply, combined with the lower expected return on a safe asset, 
should diminish the rental value of housing. 
 
Argentine data fits these predictions. Specificaly, Figure 4 confirms prediction (1) by 
showing the positive trend in house prices in US dolar terms and as a ratio of per capita GDP, a 
raw inverse measure of afordability.  
 
Figure 4. Recent Evolution of Housing Prices 
Prices per square meter in three Buenos Aires City neighborhoods 
Curent US$ As % of GDP per capita 
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Source: Authors’ based on data from Toribio Achaval and FIEL. 
 
 
Figure 5 presents evidence on the remaining points. Figure 5A shows an increase, for the 
Buenos Aires region, in the square meters of rental supply for rental compared to the sales 
supply. In turn, Figure 5B shows that the increase in price of housing was stronger than in the 
cost of building, meaning that Tobin’s q has gone up. Figure 5C displays the average number of 
monthly family incomes needed to buy a two-bedroom house, a ratio that is much higher in the 
2000s than in the 1990s. Figure 5D shows that, on average, home ownership has falen since the 
crisis.19
                                                                               
example, Putnam, 1979, about residential location choices). As they are not flexible enough to opt for a more 
afordable alternative, they would remain renters (or live with parents or under similar housing arrangements). Such 
preferences reinforce the belief that the most binding constraint in the mortgage market is the lack of demand by 
middle-income households, the natural mortgage clientele, which is associated with affordability. 
 This trend is explained by a rather flat life cycle ownership patern for household heads 
above 30 years old at the time of the crisis, but particularly by a sharper fal in the ownership rate 
19 Notice that the ownership rate in 1993 was close to the highest level for the whole 1993-2009 period. Since by 
1993 the mortgage market had not taken of, this means that the high ownership rate in Argentina has litle to do 
with mortgage market developments. 
20 
 
of younger households. For instance, in 1998, 54 percent of household heads between 25 and 30 
years old were owners, and just 45 percent in 2003 (47 percent in 2009). Jointly breaking down 
figures by income and age (results available from the authors), the ownership rate dropped 
particularly for young middle income households (deciles 6-8 by total household income). These 
are the households that should be a priori more affected by afordability issues; households at the 
extremes of the income distribution, and individuals at the extremes of the age distribution, 
should be more immune to these housing market trends.20
Finaly, 5E shows that the rental yield has falen significantly after the crisis, and 5F 
shows that new mortgage loans have not folowed the increase in home sales. 
 
 
                         
20 We also tested whether household formation changed in the after crisis period. Our prior belief was that young 
people would emancipate at older age as housing become less affordable after the crisis. Simple test for average 
household formation rate does not show a significant diference. The lack of change might be explained by the 
relative fal of rental price. A deeper analysis, which is out of the scope of this paper, should take into account 
emancipation rates by income groups, since it is likely that affordability hit harder in middle income households. 
21 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Main Stylized Facts 
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5C. Afordability. GBA Region 5D. Home Ownership Rate by cohort 
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AFFORDABILITY:INCOME TO PRICE RATIO
Average 1980-2009 =  100
 
 1993 1998 2003 2009 
20-24 38% 44% 25% 39% 
25-30 47% 54% 45% 47% 
31-35 59% 62% 58% 52% 
36-40 69% 68% 67% 58% 
41-45 76% 75% 70% 70% 
46-50 79% 82% 80% 72% 
51-55 83% 86% 82% 80% 
56-60 86% 85% 83% 81% 
61-65 87% 87% 85% 84% 
Total 76% 77% 73% 72% 
 
Source: Authors’ formulation based on data from Toribio Achaval and 
FIEL and EPH Survey 
Source: Based on EPHs. 
5E. Rental Yield in Buenos Aires City 
(Rental Income to Home Price ratio) 
5F. Home Sales and New Mortgages in Buenos Aires City 
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To explore the affordability hypothesis in greater depth we finish this section by running 
a simple simulation exercise based on microdata from household surveys.21
 
 We estimate whether 
the family has enough income to obtain a mortgage necessary to buy a typical house for its type 
(according to family size and income decile) in 1999 and 2009. We adopt the folowing 
assumptions: 
1. As we only have prices for relatively expensive neighborhoods of Buenos 
Aires City, we assume that the observed prices are those of houses for 
families in the top income decile, and then we re-compute house prices for 
other income deciles using expenditure on housing (rent) by decile based 
on microdata from the 1997 Household Expenditure Survey. Prices by 
decile are computed for 1999 and 2009.22
2. Households with housing needs are non-owners (i.e., renters and 
occupants) and owners living in houses of very low quality. The later are 
those who own houses in the lowest 10 percent of the distribution of a 
quality index we constructed using factor analysis and five attributes 
available in both surveys: the quality of floors, the existence of both 
running water and a bathroom inside the house, a flush toilet with some 
flushing mechanism and a connection to public sewerage. 
 
3. Qualified households are those able to pay the instalment-to-income ratio 
required by banking institutions. In the baseline simulation we only use 
formal income but we also perform simulations with a more flexible 
definition, adding to formal income 50 percent of informal income.23
 
 
The main results of our simulation exercise are shown in Table 5. As is clear, the share of 
potential borowers colapsed in 2009 compared to 1999, explained mainly by a large increase in 
the relative price of housing to household income. For example, under a flexible definition of 
income, and considering a 15-year mortgage at a nominal interest rate of 8 percent,24
                         
21 This approach was folowed in Gautier et al. (2006). 
 with an 80 
percent LTV and instalment payments no greater than 30 percent of total income, the market 
22 In both cases we use the last sample of the year, that is, the second semester of 1999 and the last quarter of 2009. 
23 Technicaly the survey only identifies whether the worker contributes to the Social Security System or not.  
24 Other costs amount to 2 percentage points of the loan, which means that the effective interest rate reaches 10 
percent annualy for this case.  
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size (“would-be borowers”) colapsed from 30 percent in 1999 to just 7 percent in 2009. If 
instead we only take into account verifiable income (formal income), only 3.7 percent  of 
households in 1999 and just 0.9 percent in 2009 would be able to obtain a mortgage in 2009 (in 
spite of a fal in informality from 52 percent in 1999 to 44 percent in 2009). 
 
Table 5. Mortgage Loans Potential Demand 
LTV 80% and instalment ratio less than 30% 
 
 Nominal interest rate 
 1999 2009 
Loan Term  
(years) 6.0% 8.0% 12.0% 14.0% 6.0% 8.0% 12.0% 14.0% 
Market size (% of total households) 
10 13.0% 10.2% 5.5% 4.4% 2.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 
15 40.0% 30.0% 13.6% 11.4% 8.8% 7.0% 4.0% 3.0% 
25 50.0% 40.0% 17.0% 13.6% 15.7% 10.9% 4.9% 3.0% 
Market size with formal income only (% of total households) 
10 2.2% 1.6% 0.7% 0.7% 0.9% 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% 
15 6.9% 3.7% 1.6% 0.7% 1.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.0% 
25 19.4% 8.6% 2.2% 1.6% 1.9% 1.9% 0.9% 0.9% 
Households with housing problems who could aford a loan (%) 
10 1.6% 0.9% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 
15 12.0% 3.6% 0.9% 0.9% 0.7% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 
25 23.1% 12.0% 1.6% 0.9% 1.8% 0.7% 0.4% 0.4% 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on EPH (1999 and 2009) and ENGH (1997). 
 
 
Another exercise is to simulate what would have happened if interest rates were lower 
(for instance, if indexation is alowed). At a 25-year loan term, an interest rate reduction from 12 
percent to 6 percent, and taking into account a flexible definition of income, the potential market 
would increase from 4.9 percent to 16 percent of households. If the LTV fals from the 80 
percent used in Table 5 to 60 percent, around 50 percent of households would be eligible for a 
loan.25
 
 Any of these credit market conditions would only benefit a tiny fraction of households 
sufering a housing deficit (not owners or low quality owners), given that they are concentrated 
in the lowest income strata. 
3.3. Quality and Ownership 
 
Given that both ownership rates and quality tend to rise pari passu with income, problems in the 
housing financial market should be more evident in young households (who depend more on 
                         
25 Results are available from the authors. 
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financing).  Several studies, notably Ortaló-Magné and Rady (1998),26 and Chiuri and Japeli 
(2003),27
In this section, we test whether, after controling for demographic factors, proxies for 
income (permanent and transitory) and household location, the change in market conditions after 
the crisis afected the timing of home purchase and the quality of housing. We folow the Chiuri 
and Jappeli approach, estimating a probit model for ownership explained by demographic 
variables (age, squared age and cubic age; family size; marital status), income proxies (years of 
education as permanent income proxy; income decile as current income), a dummy for location 
and a control for housing quality. We use the EPH surveys for 2009 (post-crisis) and 1999 (pre- 
crisis).
 analyze ownership over the life cycle. 
28 We additionaly construct a Housing Quality Index using factor analysis based on five 
atributes available in both surveys: the quality of floors, the existence of both running water and 
a bathroom inside the house, a flush toilet with some flushing mechanism and a connection to 
public sewerage.29
The results of this simple econometric exercise are displayed in Table 6. We merge both 
samples (1999 and 2009) in one database and then run a Probit regression for ownership 
(columns 1 and 2) and a OLS regression for quality (columns 3 and 4). In the first column we 
include quality as a regressor but not in the second to estimate the corelation between quality 
and ownership. The interacting dummy with quality is the time dummy (taking 1 for 2009 data). 
A similar approach is used for quality, as we include in column 3 a dumy for onwership and we 
exclude this variable in column 4. 
 
Column 1 shows that onwership and quality are negatively corelated. The interacting 
dummy for 2009 shows a positive and significant efect, which means the trade-off between 
                         
26 One important conclusion from Ortaló-Magné and Rady (1999) is that increases in the incomes of the youngest 
provoke a higher demand for smal apartments, leading to capital gains for current owners, which alow them to go 
up on the property ladder (upsizing). Another implication is that during booms the average age of first-time buyers 
drops and vice versa. 
27 They use a large international dataset to study the determinants of housing tenure in 14 countries, with a dataset of 
400,000 observations. Individual information is merged with country panel data on indicators of access to housing 
finance markets (the ratio of mortgage lending to GDP and the down payment ratio). The authors then proceed to 
estimate the age profile of home ownership controling for individual country efects, time (or cohort) efects, 
demographic variables, proxies for permanent income and mortgage market indicators. They find evidence 
consistent with the hypothesis that mortgage market imperfections affect the age profile of home ownership, forcing 
the youngest to save and postpone home purchase for later; however, this effect is to some extent atenuated and 
then reversed at older ages. 
28 EPH is representative of the urban areas for the entire country: it covers 32 urban areas, and it is a stratified 
sample, with 16,300 and 24,700 observations for each period, respectively. 
29 Flush toilet has the highest weight and having a bathroom inside the lowest. 
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qualtiy and ownership is lower in 2009 (but stil negative). The lower cofficient for 2009 means 
that a household has to sacrifice more quality to obtain ownership than in 1999. A symmetric 
result is found for the regression in columns 3 and 4. A difference between both regression is in 
education, a variable we use to proxy permanent income.  More education is associated with  
beter quality of homes, but not with ownership (i.e.,  more educated people prefer to live in a 
good quality house even when they have to rent). 
The ownership rate in the 2009 sample is significantly lower than in 1999. As is standard 
in the literature, we find that younger households are less likely to be owners, and the probability 
of ownership increases with age. Comparing 2009 with 1999, we find that the life cyle of 
ownership is flater, that is, in 2009 not only younger households were less likely to have a 
house, but also the increase in the probability with age is lower. 
Both results together imply that the ownership rate patern is diferent now than 10 years 
ago. In fact, the 2009 patern fits the life-cycle patern beter today than a decade ago, which is 
by itself evidence of less afordable houses. Now more than before, at any age the probability of 
being owner is lower but increasing over time. Also, while it was formerly possible to sacrifice 
some quality in order to own a home, this trade-of is now less easily available, so that owning a 
home of similar quality home is less likely now than before. 
The quality index grows with age, again fiting the life-cycle patern. When we focus 
only  on the subsample of owners, paterns are not diferent between the current and the past 
decade. This seems to be evidence that the quality trade-of did not change. Instead, what did 
change is that the likelihood of being an owner is lower regardless of the quality of the unit. 
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Table 6. Results 
 
                   Dependent variable 
 Pr(owner=1) Quality Index 
     (min =0 ; max = 1) 
 dF/dx dF/dx     
Age 0.0234 ** 0.0194 ** 0.0137 ** 0.0184 ** 
 0.0035  0.0030  0.0041  0.0043  
Age2 -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0002 ** -0.0003 ** 
 0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  
Age3 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 ** 0.0000 ** 
 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Age*Dummy  -0.0215 ** -0.0187 ** -0.0054 ** -0.0033  
 0.0044  0.0043  0.0014  0.0024  
Age2*Dummy 0.0004 ** 0.0003 ** 0.0001 ** 0.0001  
 0.0001  0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  
Age3*Dummy 0.0000 ** 0.0000 ** 0.0000 ** 0.0000  
 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Permanent Income (Education) 0.0041  0.0032  0.0121 ** 0.0119 ** 
 0.0045  0.0045  0.0024  0.0023  
Family Size 0.0191 ** 0.0209 ** -0.0354 ** -0.0341 ** 
 0.0032  0.0034  0.0030  0.0034  
Maried (=1 if yes) 0.0659 ** 0.0659 ** -0.0059  -0.0043  
 0.0092  0.0096  0.0058  0.0043  
Curent Income (Total Family 
Income) 0.0116 ** 0.0113 ** 0.0115 ** 0.0102 ** 
 0.0007  0.0006  0.0018  0.0020  
Quality of Housing -0.1511 **       
 0.0298        
Quality of Housing * Time 
Dummy (=1 if 2009) 0.1258 **       
 0.0313        
Time Dummy (=1 if 2009) 0.1892 ** 0.2422 ** 0.0362  0.0153  
 0.0721  0.0613  0.0326  0.0485  
Prop     -0.0191 **   
     0.0050    
Propd (= prop*year)     0.0163 *   
     0.0070    
Constant     0.5623 ** 0.4639 ** 
     0.1024  0.1184  
Obs.       36,266        26,580        36,266        26,580  
Log pseudo-likelihood -6545535.2 -6771042.3     
Pseudo R2  0.1265  0.1239  0.3327  0.3296  
Regional Dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
 
Figure 6. Age Profile 
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4. Analytical Model and Results 
 
4.1 Data Used 
 
We focus our analysis on the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Region (Area Metropolitana de Buenos 
Aires, AMBA), which comprises the autonomous city of Buenos Aires and the 24 municipalities 
in the suburbs (usualy known as Greater Buenos Aires, GBA), representing approximately one 
third of Argentina’s population. We use four diferent sources of microdata: the Household 
Consumption Survey, the national Household Survey (Encuesta Permanente de Hogares, EPH), 
SIEMPRO (Sistema de Información, Evaluación y Monitoreo de Programas Sociales) and our 
own specialy designed survey (see Appendix for methodological details). 
The Household Consumption Survey, a national-level survey that colects detailed 
information  on household consumption, is conducted every 10 years and used by the 
Ofice of Statistics to construct the Consumer Price Index.30
Our survey was conducted telephonicaly by randomly sampling over the universe of 
fixed telephone lines in AMBA; the sample consists of 1,600 households. Results on ownership 
rate and mean household characteristics are reassuringly consistent with EPH statistics. We 
repeated some SIEMPRO questions so as to be able to have updated information on key 
household characteristics, and we additionaly included a new set of questions aimed at having a 
beter grasp of housing finance and financial constraints in Argentina. For the later, we folow 
the direct method, as developed originaly by Jappeli (1990)
 EPH is a household survey for the 
main urban centers which includes information about housing ownership and quality of housing, 
available for GBA since 1974. SIEMPRO, a living conditions survey which was caried out in 
1997 and 2001, contains information about ownership, quality of housing and financing of 
housing (if the house was bought with financing, and the source of financing) for the entire 
country. 
31
                         
30 In our simulations we use the 1997 Survey since the micro data of the 2006 Survey are not publicly available. 
—or the similar approach used by 
Feder et al. (1989 and 1990). The approach of directly asking respondents about their rationing 
status was further refined by Baydas, Meyer and Aguilera-Alfred (1994), Zeler (1994), Kochar 
(1997), and Mushinski (1999). In this approach individuals can be classified into the folowing 
categories: i) unconstrained (either those not interested in applying for a mortgage or receiving 
31 Jappeli (1990) used the folowing question to determine credit rationing: “Was there any time in the past few 
years that you (or your husband/wife) thought of applying for credit at a particular place but changed your mind 
because you thought you might be turned down?” 
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the ful loan amount requested), and i) constrained (those manifesting an unmet demand for 
credit). 
Table 7 compares our results (2010) and SIEMPRO results for AMBA (1997 and 2001).  
Our survey shows that ownership of both buildings and land has falen over time (as suggested 
by the EPH survey as wel), whereas ownership of just the building (usualy building an auxiliary 
house in the house of a relative) has increased. Both trends were also observed between 1997 and 
2001 according to SIEMPRO. We also observe an increase in the share of households renting 
(16.1 percent in 2010 compared to 12 percent in 2001) and a decrease in households occupying 
without paying rent.  Squating (unlawful setlement without title on land) increased between 
2001 and 199732 and again between 2010 and 2001, which represents a worisome trend.33
In regard to how  households financed ownership, in 2010 only 20.2 percent of owners 
used any type of financing (including public housing programs and non-mortgage financing). 
This ratio is significantly higher than in 2001. 
 
Table 8 classifies households by type of financing 
for 2010. Only 10 percent of the owners resorted to mortgages (including both private and public 
banks), while personal loans (4 percent), loans from relatives (6 percent), and even public 
housing programs (0.5 represented) were equaly negligible sources of finance. As a result, 79 
percent did not use any loans at al, and over 90 percent of these households used their own 
savings to pay for housing.34
                         
32 According to SIEMPRO the increase in squating between 1997 and 2001 occurred in al regions and not only 
AMBA. 
 SIEMPRO 1997 includes a question about source of financing, but 
with less accurate classification (for instance, it does not discriminate between mortgage loans 
and other type of loans). According to this survey, 0.64 percent of owners were financed through 
public housing programs, similar to the 2010 ratio (this low share of public programs in AMBA 
is due to the regional distribution of these programs, which are more important in other regions 
of the country, as shown in Figure 7.).  
33 At the time of writing (December 2010), squating has been widespread in AMBA region, with social conflicts 
and fights between neighbors and squaters. One of the most notorious was the appropriation of Indoamerican Park 
in the city of Buenos Aires by 8,000 peoples who atempted to setle there; three squaters were kiled during the 
conflict.  
34 Of these 888 unleveraged households, only 3 households received their house from a government program and 
100 inherited their houses. 
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Table 7. Ownership and Finance in AMBA Region 
 
 SIEMPRO 
1997 
SIEMPRO 
2001 
FIEL/CEDLAS 
2010 
Ownership rate 73.7 72.3 70.4 
    Owner of Building and Land 69.28 64.88 61.94 
     Owner of Building only 4.43 7.45 8.44 
Renting 12.72 11.97 16.06 
Squatering 1.37 1.83 2.19 
Renting free 12.2 13.88 11.38 
    
Bought/Built with financing (1)   
As % of owners 19.0 22.0 20.2 
As % of total HH 14.0 15.9 14.2 
Note: (1) refers to any source of financing: mortgage loan, personal loan, family 
loan or a government subsidy. 
 
 
Table 8. Use of Loans to Buy the House, AMBA 2010 
 
Type of Loan, if any FIEL/CEDLAS 2010 
 SIEMPRO 
1997 
Mortgage loan 9.9% Banking Loan 13.0% 
Personal loan 4.1% Mutual, Labor Union or realtor 1.76% 
Family loan 6.3%   
Public housing program 0.5% Public housing program 0.64% 
Other loan 0.4% Other loan 3.64% 
Did not use any loan 78.9% Did not use any loan 81.6% 
Total number of owners 100.0%  100.0% 
 
 
Figure 7. Source of Financing for Owner, SIEMPRO 1997 
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In terms of market share, the National Mortgage Bank (Banco Hipotecario Nacional, 
BHN) had 25 percent of the market in 1997 and 21 percent in 2010. Other public banks 
(particularly Banco Nación and Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires) have gained share in 
2010, as have private banks. Only non-banking institutions have lost share.  
 
Table 9. Distribution of Loans by Lending Institution, AMBA 1997 and 2010 
 
 SIEMPRO 
1997 
FIEL/CEDLAS 
2010 
Private bank 14.87 35.90 
Public bank (excluding 
Banco Hipotecario) 
23.48 33.33 
Banco Hipotecario 25.31 21.37 
Non-bank financial 
institutions 
32.98 4.27 
Public housing program 3.36 5.13 
Total 100.00 100.00 
Note: 1997 is based on SIEMPRO who asks loans in general and not 
mortgage loans. 2010 is based in our survey and it refers specificaly to 
mortgage loans. Public housing programs are not mortgage loans but they are 
included in the table as reference. 
 
 
Table 10 shows approval rates by lending institution. They range from 85 percent in 
public banks to  63 percent in private banks and 53 percent for Banco Hipotecario (with both 
public and private ownership). 
 
Table 10. Mortgage Lending Institutions, GBA 2010 
 
Financial 
Institution 
Number of 
applications 
In % Number 
of loans 
granted 
In % % of 
accepted 
applications 
Private bank 67 39.6% 42 37.8% 62.7% 
Public bank 
(excluding Banco 
Hipotecario) 
46 27.2% 39 35.1% 84.8% 
Banco Hipotecario 47 27.8% 25 22.5% 53.2% 
Non-bank financial 
institutions 
9 5.3% 5 4.5% 55.6% 
Total 169 100.0% 111 100.0% 65.7% 
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4.2. Demand for Mortgage Loans in Argentina: New Survey Evidence 
 
As observed loan volumes are not directly informative of the underlying demand and supply 
forces, a household survey is a highly useful tool for revealing preferences and impediments to 
demand. In this section we report findings on self-reported demand for mortgages and seek to 
identify some sociodemographic factors behind the decision to apply for a loan and the reasons 
why some households are excluded from this kind of credit.35
We classify households into two groups. The first consists of households with a demand 
for mortgages, which include some that have applied to a loan and others that have not. Among 
those that actualy applied, some obtained the loan (with a subset geting as much as they wanted 
to) and others were rejected. Financialy constrained households are defined as those with a 
revealed demand for a mortgage that either decided not to ask for a loan or that applied and were 
turned down. The second group consists of households without a demand for mortgages, 
including those stating they did not need or did not want loan. 
 
The results, displayed in Table 11 and Table 12, seem to defy common sense but are in 
reality very much in line with other enterprise credit surveys (see, for example, Bebczuk, 2010). 
The folowing results are of particular interest:  
 
1. Only 43 percent of households want mortgage loans, and only 27 percent 
applied for them.  
2. Suggesting a great deal of self-selection, 64 percent of these applications were 
successful, and 95 perceived of successful applicants obtained as much credit 
as they asked for. The main reason for not applying, according to 84 percent 
of this subset of households, is potential failure to not meet banks’ minimum 
requirements. In other words, afordability seems to be a major issue in the 
Argentine mortgage market. 
3. As discussed in Table 13, of the 57 percent of households not interested in 
obtaining a mortgage, 70 percent said they did not need one. Reasons for not 
needing a mortgage include being able to save (48 percent), having inherited a 
house (17 percent), or not wanting a mortgage for other reasons (23 percent). 
                         
35 For this section we limit the analysis to those households with information on al questions, which reduces the 
sample size to 1,501. The 99 missing households do not have any particular patern and are considered as missing at 
random. 
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Reasons cited by the later group include reluctance to get into debt (75 
percent) or finding a mortgage too risky or otherwise unatractive. 
4. Central to this study, financialy constrained families represent 36 percent of 
of the total. Table 14 in turn considers mortgage applications according to the 
year they were submited. 
 
Table 11. Self-Reported Demand for Mortgages 
 
Response Row  In % of total 
Has/Had demand for a mortgage (1) 43.3% 
  Did not apply to a loan (2) 31.8% 
  Applied to a loan (3) 11.5% 
      Got the loan (4) 7.4% 
      Did not get the loan (5) 4.1% 
      Got the desired loan amount (6) 7.1% 
Has/Had no demand for a mortgage (7) 56.7% 
  Did not need the loan (8) 39.7% 
  Did not want a loan (9) 13.1% 
  Other unspecified reasons (10) 3.9% 
Total usable responses (1,501 cases) (11) 100.0% 
Ratios Rows In % 
Demand/Total responses [(1)/(11)] 43.3% 
Applications/Demand  [(3)/(1)] 26.6% 
Successful applications/Total applications [(4)/(3)] 64.2% 
Financialy constrained/Total [{(2)+(5)}/(11)] 35.9% 
Desired loan amount/Successful 
applications [(6)/(4)] 95.5% 
Do not need/No demand [(8)/(7)] 70.0% 
Do not want/No demand [(9)/(7)] 23.0% 
 
 
 
Table 12. Reasons Ofered for Not Applying or Not Having Demand for a Mortgage 
 
Reasons Number of cases In % 
Has demand but did not apply:   
Knew they would not grant the loan because did not meet the 
minimum requirements 410 86.0% 
The ofered mortgage loan amount was not enough to buy the 
desired house 7 1.5% 
Does not have enough savings for the down payment 60 12.6% 
Total 477 100.0% 
Does not need:   
Has capacity to save 285 47.8% 
Has family or friends to borow from 59 9.9% 
Inherited the house 100 16.8% 
Does not want to be an owner 16 2.7% 
Other unspecified reasons 136 22.8% 
Total 596 100.0% 
Does not want:   
Prefers avoiding debt 148 75.5% 
Is afraid of being unable to repay in the future 31 15.8% 
Loan conditions were unatractive 17 8.7% 
Total 196 100.0% 
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Table 13. Reasons Ofered for Not Applying or Not Having a Demand for a Mortgage 
by type of tenant 
 
Response (in number of cases) Total Owns Rents Occupies without rent 
Has/Had demand for a mortgage 650 353 180 117 
  Did not apply to a loan 477 242 140 95 
  Applied to a loan 173 111 40 22 
      Got the loan 111 89 0 0 
      Did not get the loan 62 22 40 22 
Has/Had no demand for a 
mortgage 851 674 77 100 
  Did not need the loan 596 489 38 69 
  Did not want a loan 196 147 31 18 
  Other unspecified reasons 59 38 8 13 
Total usable responses  1,501 1,027 257 217 
 
 
The total of 173 applications were more or less evenly distributed over three subperiods: 
before 1991 (36 percent), between 1991 and 2001 (27 percent) and between 2002 and 2010 (33 
percent). Accepted applications dropped from 90 percent in the first sub-period to 70 percent in 
the second, during the Convertibility Plan, to a record low of 33 percent in the post-
Convertibility era. We asked the main reason for the loan rejection, as shown in Table 14b, 
finding that the most common reason is lack of income. The lower approval rate in the 2000s is 
not due to bank refusal; on the contrary, lack of income is the main reason in the 2000s even 
more than in the 1990s, probably influenced by successive oficial announcements of seemingly 
accessible mortgage plans for lower income families, which encouraged some of them to apply 
for otherwise unafordable loans. 
Although the survey asks about both past demand (by those who are presently 
homeowners) and current demand (by those who are not yet owners), it is interesting to note in 
Table 14a that the later group displays higher demand than present owners seem to have had in 
the past. Specificaly, 70 percent of renters and 54 percent of occupants without rent, but only 34 
percent of owners, express demand for mortgages. However, the percentage of applicants is not 
that diferent: 16 percent of renters and 10 percent of occupants without rent asked for a loan, 
compared to 11 percent in the case of owners. This means that, despite the diferences in 
demand, self-exclusion prevents many potential borowers from tapping the banking system. 
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Table 14a. Mortgage Loan Applications over Time 
 
Mortgage 
Applications/Period Total 
Before 
1991 
1991-
2001 
2001-
2010 
Unspecified 
date 
Applied to a mortgage 
loan 173 63 47 57 6 
In % of total applications 100% 36% 27% 33% 3% 
Obtained loan 111 57 33 19 2 
Obtained desired loan 
amount 104 53 31 18 2 
Did not obtain loan 62 6 14 38 4 
% of rejected applications 36% 10% 30% 67% 67% 
% of accepted 
applications 64% 90% 70% 33% 33% 
% of accepted 
applications with desired 
loan amount 
94% 93% 94% 95% 100% 
 
 
Table 14b. Main Reason for Rejection 
Reason 
1994-
2000 
2003- 
2010 
Do not have enough income 
 
64% 
 
83% 
Satisfied the requirement but bank 
refused anyways 
 
14% 
 
2% 
House I want to buy was not 
approved 
 
7% 
 
5% 
They ofered an amount lower 
than what I needed 
 
14% 
 
10% 
Total Rejected 
 
100% 
 
100% 
Approval Rate 
 
70% 
 
33% 
 
 
Finaly, we would like to know, on the basis of the information colected during the same 
survey, whether mortgage demand and access is associated to some household characteristics. 
Table 15 reproduces data on household head age, education and occupation, household income 
and socioeconomic level and wealth (proxied in this case by car ownership), as wel as the 
number of children under 18. In turn, Table 16 reports mean diference tests on the binary 
variables presented in Table 15 By and large, these tests indicate that demand, access to credit 
and financial constraints appear to be corelated to diferent measures of income and wealth, 
including household head higher education, self-reported income, socioeconomic level and car 
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ownership, but no other household features difer significantly. This again reinforces the key role 
of afordability in mortgage demand decisions. 
 
 
Table 15. Household Characteristics 
 
Variable Whole Sample (1,501 
cases) 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Household head age<30 0.022 0.147 
Household head age [31-50] 0.151 0.358 
Household head age [51-65] 0.119 0.324 
Household head age>65 0.708 0.455 
No children under 18 0.418 0.493 
3-4 children under 18 0.076 0.265 
1-2 children under 18 0.326 0.469 
More than 5 children under 18 0.015 0.123 
HH education: Primary completed 0.288 0.453 
HH education: Secondary completed 0.440 0.497 
HH education: Tertiary completed 0.272 0.445 
Unskiled worker 0.043 0.204 
Retired 0.067 0.251 
Entrepreneur 0.019 0.135 
Skiled worker 0.617 0.486 
Unemployed 0.027 0.161 
Contributes to social security 0.537 0.499 
Monthly income below AR$2,000 0.273 0.446 
Monthly income below [AR$2,000-
AR$5,000] 
0.382 0.486 
Monthly income below [AR$5,000-
AR$10,000] 
0.083 0.275 
Monthly income above AR$10,000 0.015 0.120 
High socioeconomic level 0.176 0.381 
Middle socioeconomic level 0.351 0.477 
Low socioeconomic level 0.473 0.499 
Has no car 0.710 0.454 
Has one car 0.270 0.444 
Has 2 or more cars 0.021 0.142 
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Table 16. Mortgage Demand and Household Characteristics 
 
Variable Mean Difference Tests: t-statistic 
[Demand=1]-
[Demand=0] 
[Accepted=1]-
[Accepted=0] 
[Constrained=1]-
[Constrained=0] 
Household head age<30 0.388 -0.841 0.825 
Household head age [31-
50] 
-0.184 -0.875 -0.163 
Household head age [51-
65] 
-0.128 0.856 -0.029 
Household head age>65 0.100 0.664 -0.131 
No children under 18 0.938 -0.038 0.945 
3-4 children under 18 1.793 1.217 0.485 
1-2 children under 18 -0.404 -0.979 0.218 
More than 5 children 
under 18 
0.883 0.000 1.262 
HH education: Primary 
completed 
1.373 -1.529 2.185 
HH education: Secondary 
completed 
1.235 -2.632 1.921 
HH education: Tertiary 
completed 
-2.427 4.251 -3.844 
Unskiled worker 2.342 0.317 1.991 
Retired 1.528 -1.023 1.908 
Entrepreneur -2.340 -1.206 -1.933 
Skiled worker -0.065 -0.597 0.371 
Unemployed 0.241 1.152 -0.014 
Contributes to social 
security 
-0.719 -1.129 -0.602 
Monthly income below 
AR$2,000 
1.941 -0.828 2.467 
Monthly income below 
[AR$2,000-AR$5,000] 
2.185 -2.978 3.250 
Monthly income below 
[AR$5,000-AR$10,000] 
-0.273 3.039 -2.213 
Monthly income above 
AR$10,000 
-2.258 1.152 -2.688 
High socioeconomic level -1.244 3.178 -3.216 
Middle socioeconomic 
level 
-0.904 -1.737 -0.074 
Low socioeconomic level 1.922 -1.192 2.714 
Has no car 2.666 -2.860 3.954 
Has one car -2.392 2.848 -3.587 
Has 2 or more cars -1.075 0.220 -1.437 
         (*) Differences in bold and italics are statisticaly significant at 5% or less. 
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To close, we run in Table 17 a Heckman estimation to control for endogeneity bias via a 
two-step regression, where the first stage estimates a demand (or selection) equation and an 
access (or financial constraint) equation in the second stage.36
 
 To ensure the correspondence 
between demand and household characteristics, we restrict the analysis to households that 
became owners since 2002 onwards or stil do not own a house. Although we tried several 
specifications, the only variables that proved to be robustly significant were a high 
socioeconomic level (with the expected positive sign) in the access equation and tertiary 
education and no car ownership, with negative and positive loadings respectively, in the demand 
equation. This econometric evidence confirms the preliminary verdict from the previous 
descriptive statistics. 
Table 17. Access and Demand for Mortgage Loans 
Heckman Two-Stage Estimation 
 
Access (financial constraint) equation 
High socioeconomic level  -0.154 
 (-2.26) 
Low socioeconomic level -0.034 
 (-0.65) 
Constant 1.299 
 (6.04) 
Selection (demand) equation   
Tertiary education completed -0.234 
 (-1.84) 
No car ownership 0.287 
 (2.13) 
Constant 0.042 
 (0.32) 
Wald test (p-value) 5.22 (0.073) 
Number of observations 448 
Censored observations 196 
Uncensored observations 252 
 
 
                         
36 For a previous application of this methodology to study credit constraints for firms, see Bigsten, Colier and 
Dercon (2000). 
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5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
This paper has studied housing finance in Argentina, with an emphasis on demand for mortgage 
loans and developments folowing the 2001-2002 crisis. Both macro data and survey information 
were employed, including the results of the survey especialy  designed for this study. By 
analyzing the demand for mortgage loans we uncovered that in addition to the standard financial 
disintermediation argument (supply side) to explain mortgage market underdevelopment in 
volatile economies, demand plays a very important role as wel. The main findings are the 
folowing: 
 
1. Despite the shrinking size of the mortgage market after the crisis, housing 
prices and construction has boomed in Argentina. 
2. The contraction of the mortgage market in the 2000s compared to the 1990s 
cannot be atributed to inadequate regulations or lack of loanable resources in 
the banking system. 
3. On the contrary, market developments are consistent with a lack of demand 
for mortgages, which have become unaffordable for a large percentage of the  
population. 
4. In turn, diminished afordability is associated with segmentation among 
buyers: as housing has become a safe asset (in the sense of being 
expropriation-free when compared to bank deposits and other financial 
assets), investors’ strong demand prevents households in search of a residence 
from being eligible for a mortgage loan. 
5. While middle-income households prefer renting to moving to a worse quality 
unit or a worse location, low income households accept such a trade-of. 
6. Regardless of the lack of a dynamic mortgage market, home ownership 
continues to be around  70 percent, although the rate has declined since the 
1990s. 
7. The high ownership rate reflects widespread use of own funds to buy a house, 
wilingness to reduce the dweling quality in order to own and government 
assistance via housing programs targeting low to middle-income households. 
Other recent interventions in the mortgage market were mostly inefectual. 
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8. Ownership rate is considerably lower in middle income households with 
young heads; 
9. The survey caried out for this study confirmed many of these statements, 
showing in particular that the demand for external finance is extremely low. 
 
These results show that, in the face of the acute afordability problem, policies aimed at 
fostering the supply side of mortgages, as the Government has tried to do in recent years by 
providing loanable funds to the banking system, are bound to turn out inefective. Even the 
curent environment of low real interest rates is unlikely to overcome the lack of demand; our 
exercises on afordability atest to the fact that a very smal portion of households would be 
eligible for a mortgage, even under favorable interest rate levels and lax LTV requirements. On 
the other hand, public housing programs are not suitable for a large percentage of the population. 
The apparent major constraint from the demand (vis-à-vis the supply) side cals for a diferent set 
of policies. Policies designed to increase the amount of urban land with proper infrastructure 
would increase the supply of housing, particularly for the poor, and relax the afordability 
problem. Moreover, policies that foster the market for rental housing could address investors’ 
desire to buy housing and increase non-owners’ likelihood of renting a high-quality unit. Finaly, 
if further promotion of the mortgage market is needed, conditions must be made more favorable 
for demand; in particular, the afordability issue is likely to persist in the medium run (at least 
until conventional financial assets are again massively accepted by local investors as a store of 
value). Those can be achieved through the introduction of new instruments or demand subsidies 
to complement, or even partly substitute for, ongoing government housing programs. Of course, 
this must be weighed against the resulting fiscal burden and the opportunity costs in terms of 
other badly needed social expenditures. 
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